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The	danger	of	personalised	power	in	the	EU
The	EU	has	frequently	been	caricatured	as	a	‘faceless	bureaucracy’,	where	rules	and	procedures	take
precedence	over	powerful	personalities.	Yet	this	depersonalisation	of	power	has	recently	been
challenged	by	the	emergence	of	some	visible,	decisive	figures.	Jonathan	White	argues	that	while	this
may	be	seen	as	a	welcome	improvement	by	some	observers,	when	power	is	located	in	a	small,
rotating	cast	of	individuals	acting	at	their	own	discretion,	it	rests	on	a	precarious	foundation.
With	Mario	Draghi	making	way	for	Christine	Lagarde	as	president	of	the	European	Central	Bank,	power	has	now
passed	from	one	famed	crisis	manager	to	another.	Lauded	by	the	Financial	Times	in	2012	as	“person	of	the	year”
and	“the	man	who	saved	the	eurozone”,	Draghi	has	recently	been	credited	once	more,	by	Merkel,	Macron	and
others,	with	having	rescued	the	currency	at	its	moment	of	greatest	peril.	His	successor	Lagarde,	previously	head	of
the	IMF,	is	another	technocrat	whose	reputation	has	been	built	on	crisis	management.
A	persistent	observation	of	those	who	have	worked	close	to	Draghi	is	that	he	operates	in	a	centralised,	personal
fashion.	While	he	is	praised	as	a	virtuoso	individual,	he	is	also	criticised	for	running	affairs	through	a	‘kitchen
cabinet’	of	loyalists.	These	reports	give	the	impression	of	a	powerful	individual	surrounded	by	a	small	circle	of
trusted	advisers,	governing	by	informality	and	discretion.
What	has	been	true	of	the	ECB	has	also	been	true	of	the	wider	EU	in	this	period.	From	the	early	2010s,	the
governing	of	the	euro	crisis	entailed	the	centralisation	of	power	in	the	hands	of	a	small	group	of	technocrats	and
political	leaders.	Evaluations	of	the	Troika,	which	brought	together	figures	of	the	Commission,	ECB	and	IMF,
suggest	the	pattern	was	of	individuals	and	groups	departing	from	institutional	procedure,	improvising	their	methods
along	the	way.	New	decision-making	forums	such	as	the	Eurogroup	emerged	and	were	celebrated	by	insiders
precisely	for	their	informality	and	absence	of	codified	procedures.
At	the	same	time	as	power	was	individualised	within	these	institutions,	close	ties	formed	between	them.	Informal
collaboration	was	common,	in	the	Troika	and	beyond.	Ad-hoc	gatherings	of	leaders	such	as	the	‘Frankfurt	group’
spoke	to	the	importance	of	close	working	relations.	Such	were	the	conditions	in	which	individuals	might,	at	least	in
the	public	imagination,	be	credited	with	“saving	the	eurozone”	by	their	own	interventions.	Power	was	heavily
personalised.
Christine	Lagarde	and	Mario	Draghi,	Credit:	IMF	Staff	Photo/Stephen	Jaffe	(CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)
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The	making	of	modern	governing	authority	is	commonly	described	as	a	process	of	de-personalisation.	Since	Max
Weber,	we	have	been	taught	to	see	it	as	the	rise	of	rules,	institutions	and	procedures,	of	separating	power	from	the
persons	who	wield	power	at	a	given	moment.	Whereas	feudalism	was	based	mainly	on	personal	ties	–	oaths	of
allegiance,	lineage	and	heredity,	the	networks	of	the	king’s	household	–	later	political	forms	seemed	to	mark	a
departure.	Officials	could	represent	the	state,	but	did	not	embody	it.
This	tendency	of	depersonalisation	was	reflected	in	the	changing	meaning	of	political	language.	The
word	stato	once	described	a	personal	quality	–	status	regalis,	the	king’s	majesty	–	but	came	to	evoke	a	realm,	the
“state”.	Status	became	an	independent	idea,	not	the	attribute	of	a	prince.
The	practice	of	power,	too,	changed	as	it	was	depersonalised.	In	place	of	a	monarch	surrounded	by	trusted
associates,	early	bureaucracies	began	to	take	shape,	regulated	by	procedures	such	as	auditing.	In	England,	steps
of	this	kind	taken	in	Henry	VIII’s	reign	would	later	be	characterised	by	historians	as	a	“revolution	in	government”,	the
Tudor	contribution	to	the	making	of	the	English	state.
Just	how	far	political	power	was	ever	truly	depersonalised	is	debatable.	Institutions,	rules	and	procedures	need
people	to	enact	and	enforce	them.	While	they	are	often	contrasted,	the	“rule	of	law”	and	the	“rule	of	persons”	have
always	been	inseparable	at	some	level.	Marxists	and	others	have	long	argued	that	powerful	interests	and
ideologies	tend	to	skew	the	exercise	of	rule	in	favour	of	the	few.	Institutions	have	often	seemed	little	more	than	a
cover	for	the	exercise	of	power	by	individuals	and	the	classes	they	represent.	Weber	too	believed	that	charismatic
forms	of	authority	lingered	on	in	modern	politics,	despite	what	he	called	‘the	general	tendency	to	impersonality’.
The	EU	was,	for	some,	the	depersonalisation	of	power	writ	large.	Sometimes	fondly,	sometimes	disparagingly,	it
has	been	seen	as	the	archetype	of	power	detached	from	individuals	and	their	confidants.	It	has	been	caricatured	as
a	‘faceless’	bureaucracy,	devoted	to	rules	and	procedures.	Draghi	himself	always	stressed	that	his	actions	were
closely	constrained	by	the	terms	of	office	–	that	to	preserve	the	euro	he	would	do	“whatever	it	takes”,	but	“within	our
mandate”.	What	the	events	of	the	last	decade	have	made	clear,	however,	is	the	other	side	of	the	story:	how
European	integration	has	created	new	opportunities	for	the	personalisation	of	power,	especially	in	periods	of
upheaval.
What	characterises	Draghi,	Lagarde	and	other	EU	leaders	in	this	period	has	been	the	tendency	to	govern	in	crisis
mode.	Emergency	politics	is	a	key	driver	of	personalised	rule,	as	officials	cite	exceptional	circumstances	as	reason
to	depart	from	institutional	and	constitutional	script.	Fast-moving	conditions	offer	a	licence	for	cutting	out	chains	of
command	and	reclaiming	power	in	informal	networks.
Clearly	a	politics	of	persons	carries	the	appealing	promise	of	intelligibility	–	a	world	of	identifiable	agents	rather	than
bureaucratic	structures.	When	governing	authority	has	a	recognisable	face,	one	has	something	to	point	at,	also	to
criticise.	In	the	EU,	where	responsibility	for	decisions	is	notoriously	hard	to	attribute,	the	emergence	of	visible,
decisive	individuals	may	seem	welcome.	But	the	costs	are	high.	More	personalised	forms	of	rule	can	easily	slip	into
arbitrary	executive	power;	leaders	who	have	learned	to	act	on	impulse	rarely	give	up.	Voices	of	opposition,
meanwhile,	can	become	more	focused	on	procedural	transgressions	than	the	critical	evaluation	of	policy	itself.
Most	fundamentally,	the	personalisation	of	power	challenges	an	important	distinction.	De-personalisation	entailed	a
separation	between	rulers	and	the	office	of	rule,	with	the	implication	that	one	could	oppose	the	incumbents	without
opposing	the	system.	This	was	how	the	modern	state	achieved	a	measure	of	legitimacy	–	it	became	possible	to
accept	power	while	opposing	those	who	wielded	it.	But	when	power	is	personalised	once	more,	the	distinction
becomes	harder	to	sustain.	And	as	citizens	become	less	confident	in	institutions,	to	oppose	those	in	charge	is	to
oppose	the	system	as	a	whole.
As	Draghi	hands	over	to	Lagarde,	the	distinction	in	the	ECB	between	persons	and	offices	is	briefly	asserted	once
more.	But	the	challenge	for	the	wider	EU	is	to	find	a	more	procedural	style	of	governing,	also	rooted	in	democratic
principles.	When	power	is	located	in	a	small,	rotating	cast	of	individuals	acting	at	their	own	discretion,	it	rests	on	a
precarious	foundation.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	originally	appeared	at	the	New	Statesman.	It	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of
EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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